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The Repeal of General Utilities:
Estate Tax Implications
Corporate distribution of appreciated assets to shareholders
will now result in recognition of corporate gain
By MITCHELL M. GANS
Associate Professor of Law
Hofstra University
Hempstead, N.Y.

he story begins with the Supreme
were to then liquidate the corporation,
the aggregate basis to the purchaser for
Court’s decision in General Util
all of the assets received as a result of
ities & Operating Co. vs. Helver
the liquidation would, as a practical
ing, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). The court held
matter, equal the amount paid for the
in General Utilities that a distribution
stock.' And the liquidation of the cor
by a corporation of appreciated assets
poration in this fashion by the pur
to its shareholders did not result in a
chaser would not produce any corpo
taxable gain to the corporation. Con
rate tax.^
gress subsequently adopted this non
Similar treatment was available when
recognition rule in the handful of code
a corporation sold its assets and then
sections dealing with corporate distri
liquidated within one year: The pur
butions. The non-recognition principle
chaser would have a basis equal to cost;
underlying these code sections has been
the corporation would, as a general
popularly referred to as the “General
matter, not be subject to tax on the
Utilities àocirint.”
sale;’ and the shareholder of the liqui
Although Congress as well as the
dating corporation would be taxable on
courts created various exceptions to the
his or her gain.
doctrine over the years, the doctrine has
remained largely intact. In the 1986 Act
After the Act
(the Act), however, Congress repealed
The 1986 Act radically changes the
the doctrine. Consequently, corporate
tax rules in the corporate-liquidation
distributions of appreciated assets to
context. The Act repeals the section 337
shareholders will now result in the rec
rule that sales made within one year of
ognition of a corporate gain.
liquidation were not taxable to the cor
The purpose of this article is to ex
poration.“ The Act also alters section
amine the implications of the repeal of
336 to provide that a corporation must
the General Utilities doctrine in the
recognize gain or loss on all of its assets
context of estate-tax valuation.
at the time of liquidation as if the cor
poration had sold its assets at fair mar
Before the Act
ket value.’ Thus, under the Act, the
To commence, a review of the prewithdrawal of assets from corporate so
Act tax rules is appropriate. A share
lution will, as a general matter, produce
holder’s sale of stock would not trigger
a corporate tax on the gain inherent in
a corporate tax on the appreciation in
the corporation’s assets.’
herent in the corporate assets — a rule
Given that the new corporate tax on
not changed by the Act. The pur
liquidations is only imposed upon the
chaser’s cost would determine the basis
withdrawal of assets from corporate so
in the acquired stock. If the purchaser

T
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lution, the purchaser is, in effect, given
an election: 1) to leave the assets in the
acquired corporation, which would
produce no corporate tax, or 2) to liq
uidate the corporation and thereby
withdraw the assets from the corpora
tion, which would produce a corporate
tax on all appreciation inherent in the
corporation’s assets.’ If the second op
tion is elected, the purchaser would en
joy a basis in the acquired assets equal
to the cost incurred in acquiring the
stock. On the other hand, if the first
option is elected, the assets, of course,
remain in the corporation and the cor
poration’s basis in the assets remains
what it was prior to the acquisition.
In the case of an acquired corpora
tion having appreciated assets, the pur
chaser would be anxious to withdraw
the assets from corporate solution in
order to secure a basis equal to the
amount paid for the stock in the ac
quired corporation — a basis that
would be higher than the corporation’s
basis in the assets. But the desire to liq
uidate the acquired corporation for the
purpose of increasing basis must be
weighed against the corporate tax cost
incurred by reason of the liquidation.
Because under prior law no corporate
tax was imposed as a general matter at
the time of liquidation, the decision to
liquidate was in many cases made as a
matter of course.
Under the Act, however, purchasers
will be deterred by the corporate tax
from liquidating. Each dollar of basis
43

increase generated by the liquidation
will trigger a dollar of taxable income to
the corporation at the time of liquida
tion. Obviously, the present value of the
tax benefits inherent in a dollar of basis
increase will never be greater than —
and indeed will almost always be less
than — the 34 cents of tax payment re
quired to be made by the corporation at
the time of liquidation (assuming a cor
porate tax rate of 34 percent).
The disinclination of purchasers to
liquidate under the Act will have an im
pact on the negotiations of the purchase
price. For example, assume that an
investor is interested in purchasing an
improved parcel of real estate. The sell
er’s asking price is $1 million. If the
investor pays $1 million, the investor’s
basis in the real estate would be $1 mil
lion. If, however, the real estate were
owned by a corporation and its basis in
the real estate were only $500,000 (either
because the building has been depre
ciated or because it has appreciated in
value), the investor would be willing to
pay $1 million for the real estate, but
something less for the stock in the cor
poration. The investor’s willingness to
pay more for the real estate than for the

The disinclination
of purchasers to
liquidate under the
Act will have an
impact on the
negotiations of the
purchase price.
stock is probably attributable to the de
preciation deduction he anticipates en
joying. The investor would prefer to
take the depreciation deductions on a
basis of SI million dollars than on the
corporation’s basis of $500,000.*
Indeed, the investor would probably
tell the seller that, unless the seller com
pensated the investor for the investor’s
willingness to accept a basis of
$500,000, the investor would buy a
comparable piece of real estate for $1
million, in which he would enjoy a ba
sis of $1 million. By this point in the
negotiation, the seller should recognize
that he would be in a much better posi-

Low
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tion if he, as opposed to the corpora
tion, owned the real estate and that the
presence of the corporation diminishes
the value of his asset.
At this juncture, the investor might
offer to pay $830,000 for all of the
stock in the corporation. After pur
chasing the stock, the investor could
liquidate the corporation and thereby
receive a basis in the real estate of $1
million. Of course, the liquidation
would trigger a corporate tax of
$170,000 (corporate tax rate of 34 per
cent imposed upon the appreciation of
$500,000).’ If the seller accepts the of
fer, the purchaser will have incurred an
out-of-pocket cost of $1 million and will
enjoy a basis in the real estate of $1
million.
If the seller is well advised, he will
point out that a portion of the purchase
price is attributable to the land and,
therefore, not subject to depreciation.
He will also point out that the deprecia
tion deduction is not immediately avail
able, but must be spread over a period
of years. The investor would reply that
though the portion of the basis attrib
utable to the land is not depreciable, the
basis in the land would certainly be sig
nificant should the investor decide to
sell the property at some point. The
seller should then offer to reduce the $1
million asking price by the present value
of the forgone tax benefits inherent in a
$500,000 basis. An exact quantification
of the present value of the forgone tax
benefit would, however, be impossible:
Future tax rates are difficult to predict;
whether, and if so, when, the investor
might sell the property might well be
impossible to forecast as well.

ACTUARIES AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT CONSULTANTS ]

A few observations about this nego
tiation can be made. The investor would
not be willing to pay $1 million for the
stock unless the seller agreed to pay the
tax cost inherent in a liquidation. The
present value of the forgone tax benefit
will in all probability be less than the tax
that would be imposed were the corpo
ration to liquidate. The investor would
probably be willing to accept as a price
reduction the present value of the for
gone tax benefit, though the calculation
required may well be difficult.
Thus, the 1986 Act’s elimination of
the possibility of liquidating a corpora
tion on a tax-free basis impacts nega
tively on the value of corporate stock.'*
In valuing corporate stock for estate-tax
purposes, will the 1RS and the courts
factor into the equation this negative
impact? In other words, will a discount
TRUSTS & ESTATES / JULY 1987
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be permitted for diminution in value at
tributable to the imposition of a tax at
liquidation?
Assets are included in the gross estate
for estate tax purposes at fair market
value. Recognizing that the measure
ment of fair market value is necessarily
inexact, the courts and the Service have
sought to elucidate the principles in
volved. Depending on the business of
the corporation under inquiry, different
valuation approaches are emphasized.
Thus, the valuation techniques used for
an operating company are different
from those used for an investment
holding company: In the former case,
the earnings capacity of the company is
most often crucial, whereas the value of
the corporation’s assets in the hands of
the shareholders following a hypotheti
cal liquidation is generally the guiding
principle in the latter case."
As one hypothesizes a liquidation in
order to value stock in a holding com
pany, the question becomes whether the
costs of such a liquidation should be
permitted as a discount. More specifi
cally, the issue here is whether the cor
porate tax imposed at liquidation on the
appreciation in corporate assets is a cost
for which a reduction or discount in
value is appropriate.
The notion that great weight should
be given to the value of the corpora
tion’s underlying assets in the context of
a holding or investment company is set
forth in Revs. Rul. 59-60. There, in dis
cussing the appropriate valuation tech
nique for such companies, the Service
indicated that the costs of liquidation
“merit consideration.”'^
One might infer from this ruling that
a corporate income tax that would be
imposed on appreciation in the event of
a liquidation should be viewed as a cost
of liquidation and therefore entitled to
appropriate consideration in the valua
tion process.But the courts have for the
most part been reluctant to permit a
discount for such costs." Essentially, the
courts have reasoned that the liability to
make payment of corporate tax on the
appreciation inherent in corporate as
sets is either speculative (i.e., dependent
upon corporate sales that may or may
not be made) or indeed very unlikely to
accrue (i.e., the corporation might well
be liquidated on a tax-free basis or
might never be liquidated). While this
reasoning will be examined in light of
the repeal of General Utilities, the cases
should first be reviewed.

The valuation
techniques used for
an operating company
are different from
those used for
an investment
holding company.
72 T.C.I062 (1979), the taxpayer ar
gued that the value of the stock in the
holding company at issue should be re
duced for the potential capital gains tax
the corporation would be required to
pay were a liquidation to occur. The
court refused to permit a discount for
such a tax:
We consider such a discount unwar
ranted under the net asset valuation tech
nique employed herein, where there is no
evidence that a liquidation of the invest
ment companies was planned or that it
could not have been accomplished with
out incurring a capital gains tax at the
corporate level (72 T.C. at 1087).

In a footnote, the court explained
that the corporate tax could be avoided
either by the use of section 337, as then
in effect, or by the use of the predeces
sor of section 338 (section 334 (b)(2)).
The footnote suggests that, in the ab
sence of these techniques permitting taxfree liquidation, the court would have
been inclined to allow a discount for the
corporate tax. The excerpt from the text
of the decision, however, may point in
a different direction. The text indicates
that the court relied upon not merely
the availability of the tax-free tech
nique, but also the taxpayer’s failure to
prove that a liquidation could be antic
ipated.
Did the court intend to suggest that if
a liquidation were taxable, a discount
should not be permitted unless proof of
an anticipated liquidation is present? In
articulating two grounds for denying a
discount — availability of tax-free tech
niques and the absence of proof that a
liquidation was planned — the court did
not clarify what its position would be if
one of these grounds were removed. In
other words, we can only speculate
whether the court would permit a dis
count where the tax-free techniques are
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Reducing Value
In Estate of Piper vs. Commissioner,
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repealed, as has occurred, and there is
no proof of an anticipated liquidation.
In Estate of Thalheimer vs. Commis
sioner, T.C. Memo, 1974-203, aff’d.
532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976), which was
cited in Piper, the court denied a dis
count for tax solely on the basis that
there was no evidence of a planned liq
uidation:
The record clearly shows that
ATAPCO is a diverse, viable going con
cern and there is no evidence of a plan for
its liquidation, voluntary or otherwise.
Under these circumstances, the discounts
applied by petitioners’ expert in ascer
taining underlying net asset value per
share of class A and class B ATAPCO
common stock were inappropriate and
improper.

Other Cases
Other cases cited by Piper where a
discount was denied also placed heavy
reliance on the absence of proof that a
liquidation had been planned. See Gailun vs. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1974-284; and McTighe vs. Commis
sioner, T.C. Memo 1977-410.
The concern of the courts with the
speculative nature of the corporate-level
tax can be traced to Estate of Cruik-

The parties had agreed
that the stock
was to be valued
in accordance
with the value of
the corporation 's
underlying assets.
shank vs. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 162
(1947), which was also cited by Piper.
There, the decedent owned stock in a
family corporation that was an invest
ment holding company. The taxpayer
and the government had stipulated as to
the value of the underlying assets. In
addition, the parties had agreed that the
stock was to be valued in accordance
with the value of the corporation’s un
derlying assets. The only issue before
the court was whether a discount from
the stipulated value should be permitted
for the cost of disposing of the corpo
ration’s assets (i.e., stamp taxes, corpo
rate capital gains taxes and commis-
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I
The court offered two alternative I
reasons for denying the discount. First, I
the court refused to assume that the as- |
sions). The court held that a discount
was not available with respect to any of
these disposition costs.
i

sets would be removed in a taxable I

I

transaction from corporate solution. In
the court’s perception, a taxable dispo- j
sition by the corporation of its assets
was conjectural; therefore, the tax costs
associated with such a disposition
should be disregarded. Second, the
court indicated that where the value of
corporate stock is derived by examining
the value of the underlying corporate \
assets, the focus should be on the price
the corporate assets would bring in the
marketplace. So viewed, the value of
the underlying assets should be deter
mined without regard to any income-tax
liability that would be incurred by the
corporation on the sale.
As to the court’s “conjecture” ra
tionale, it should be noted that the cor
poration could have completely avoided
tax liability on the appreciation inher
ent in its assets. At that time, a corpo
ration was permitted to distribute its as
sets in liquidation without paying a cor
porate tax. The corporation, of course, i
would have been subject to income tax
had it sold its assets. But there was ap-j
parently nothing in the record before
the court to suggest that a sale was an
ticipated. And the court could not over
look the possibility that a liquidation
might occur, which would eliminate all
corporate tax on the appreciation in the
corporation’s assets, though the court
did not explicitly mention such a possi
bility. Thus, the court would obviously
have been uncomfortable in granting a
discount for corporate tax that might
never be paid.
It would seem that, given the court’s
alternative rationale, it would not allow
a discount for taxes, even if evidence of
an anticipated sale or corporate-tax
triggering event were present. The price
that the corporation could obtain in the
marketplace for its assets would not be
affected by the amount of corporate in
come tax that the sale or other tax-trig
gering event would generate. Thus, the
Cruikshank court would presumably
still deny a discount for taxes even
where it was certain that a corporate tax
would ultimately be paid.
Although the Piper court cited
Cruikshank, its discussion of the issue
was framed in terms of Cruikshank’s
“conjecture” rationale — not even a
reference was made to Cruikshank’s al
ternative rationale. This might be read
TRUSTS & ESTATES / JULY 1987

as an implicit disavowal of Cruikshank’s alternative rationale. But this
reading is belied by Piper’s citation to
Estate of Robinson, 69 T.C. 222 (1977).
In Robinson, the decedent owned an
: installment obligation that was received
fin a sale for which the decedent elected
Ito report gain on the installment basis.
| The estate sought a discount for the inIcome taxes that would be paid by the
beneficiaries (or the estate) on the gain
deferred by the decedent. The court re
jected the discount on the ground that
estate-tax value should be determined
by the price that a hypothetical buyer
would be willing to pay for the install
ment obligation. The income tax gener
ated by the sale of the obligation would
have no bearing upon the price that
such a buyer would offer.
The Robinson court’s analysis is the
same as the alternative rationale in
Cruikshank. It would seem, therefore,
that as reflected by this citation to Rob
inson, the Piper court probably in
tended to rely on both rationales artic
ulated in Cruikshank. Thus, it is possi
ble that the Tax Court would continue
to deny a discount for taxes even if it
were to conclude that the repeal of
General Utilities negated the conjec
tural character of the corporate-level
tax.

Character of the Tax

I

■
1
i

I

'

In the author’s view, the tax-discount
issue should turn solely on an analysis
of the conjectural character of the tax,
and the Cruikshank alternative ration
ale should be limited to the Robinsontype template. As the court in Robinson
held, a discount should not be permit
ted for the income tax that would be
generated by a sale of the asset subject
to valuation. To permit such a discount
would deviate from the valuation norm,
namely, the price that a hypothetical
buyer would be willing to pay; such a
buyer would make a judgment as to the
price he would offer without regard to
the income tax payable by the seller.
But to extend this reasoning, as the
Piper court apparently did by its citation to Robinson, into a context where
the valuation of corporate stock is determined by calculating the net asset
value of underlying assets is inappro
priate. The issue in this context is not
the price that the underlying assets
would bring in the marketplace, but
rather the price the marketplace would
set for the corporate stock.
To be sure, the repeal of General
Utilities has affected the conjectural as
pect of the corporate-level tax. Under
TRUSTS & ESTATES / JULY 1987

the Act, it is certain that a corporation
with appreciated assets will pay tax on
the appreciation should the corporation
sell the assets or liquidate — whereas,
under the pre-Act law, no such cer
tainty existed because of the possibility
of a tax-free liquidation. But since it is
possible that the corporation will nei
ther sell its assets nor liquidate, it is not
certain that the corporation will even
tually pay the corporate tax. Although
this uncertainty leaves the tax issue
somewhat conjectural, the issue is sub
stantially less conjectural than it was
under General Utilities.
The question is whether, under the
Act, the tax issue remains too conjec
tural to permit a discount. Even though
under the Act a corporate tax might
never be paid on appreciation in corpo
rate assets, the marketplace of hypothetijcal purchasers will surely want to
know, and seek appropriate discount
for, any negative tax consequence in
herent in the corporate structure. Where
the value of corporate stock is valued by
reference to the corporation’s underly
ing assets and liabilities and where, as
the Act now requires, a tax is imposed
when assets are removed from corpo
rate solution (whether at sale or liqui
dation), the tax should be treated like
any other contingent liability of the
corporation.
Just as the purchaser of corporate
stock would take into account a non-tax
corporate liability in making a judg
ment about the net value of the under
lying assets, so too he would take into
account the corporate tax liability that
would accrue at the point of sale or liq
uidation. And even if the purchaser did
not contemplate a sale or liquidation, he
would surely take into account in deter
mining an appropriate price his concern
about securing a fair-market value basis
in the depreciable assets held by the ac
quired corporation; that is to say, he
would seek a discount to compensate
for the diminished depreciation deduc
tion attributable to a basis in the under
lying assets that is below fair market
value. To reflect these realities of the
marketplace, a discount should be per
mitted for the corporate-level tax de
spite any residual conjecture surround
ing the issue.
Valuation on the basis of underlying
asset value is predicated on the assump
tion of a hypothetical liquidation. It
would seem inconsistent to hypothesize
a liquidation for purposes of valuing the
underlying assets, while ignoring the
liquidation because it is hypothetical or
conjectual as the focus shifts to the cor-
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porate tax liability that would be trig
gered by a liquidation.
Before completing an analysis of the
conjecture issue, it must be observed
that the Act does permit one method by
which many corporations can still liqui
date without incurring a corporate tax.
Under new § 1374, a C corporation that
converts over to an S corporation will
be required to pay a corporate-level tax
at the time of liquidation on “built-in
gains” — essentially the appreciation
accruing prior to the S corporation
election. But this new tax on “built-in
gains” is only applicable to asset dispo
sitions made by the corporation for the
10-year period beginning on the date of
its conversion to S status. Thus, a tech
nique still exists by which a corporation
that meets the requirement for an S
election can liquidate or sell its assets
without triggering a corporate-level tax:
If a corporation converts over to an S
corporation and then waits 10 years be
fore disposing of its assets, no tax will
be imposed on the corporation in con
nection with the liquidation or the sale
of its assets.
Does this technique for avoiding the
corporate tax make the discount inap
propriate? A hypothetical purchaser
might certainly take the availability of
this technique into account as he con
siders the price he would be willing to
pay for the stock. And in doing so, he
would give thought to his plans for the
corporation after acquisition. If, for
example, he expected to maintain the
corporation for a substantial period of
time, he might not be concerned about
the corporate-tax issue, recognizing that
the issue could be avoided by making an
S election and waiting 10 years before
liquidating — though waiting 10 years
for the basis step-up and concomitant
depreciation deduction produced by a
liquidation will result in foregone tax
savings. On the other hand, if such a
purchaser contemplated a possible sale
of the corporate assets or a liquidation
within the near term, the tax issue
would certainly loom larger.
Without question, the 10-year wait
ing period complicates the conjecture
issue. But it is certain that a purchaser
would prefer to acquire the underlying
assets than the stock if the stock carried
with it two unpleasant alternatives: 1) a
corporate tax in the event of liquidation
or; 2) a 10-year waiting period before
liquidating. It would seem that, despite
the availability of an S election, a wellinformed purchaser would demand an
appropriate discount if he purchased the
stock and thereby agreed to endure one

Conclusion

If such a purchaser
contemplated a possible
sale of the corporate
assets or a liquidation
within the near term,
the tax issue would
certainly loom larger.
of these unpleasant alternatives. In ad
dition, since the field of hypothetical
purchasers eligible to use the S-election
technique is not without limits,'“ the de
mand for such a discount would be dif
ficult for a hypothetical seller to resist.
Thus, though the amount of the dis
count may be difficult to calculate, it is
nevertheless appropriate, given these
observations about the marketplace of
hypothetical purchasers.
Thus far, the primary focus of this
article has been on the valuation of
holding- or investment-type companies.
Before concluding, a few words are in
order about operating companies.

Operating Companies
Whereas a holding- or investmenttype company is valued by emphasizing
the net value of the corporation’s un
derlying assets, an operating company
that sells goods or services is valued,
according to Revs. Rul. 59-60, by em
phasizing earnings. The computation of
earnings for this purpose is made on an
after-tax basis.” Consequently, a dis
count for the corporate-tax issue should
be implicitly factored into the valua
tion.
In other words, an operating com
pany with plant and equipment having
a low basis in relation to fair market
value would be entitled to less deprecia
tion for tax purposes than would a sim
ilar company with a basis in its assets
approximating fair market value. Be
cause of the disparity in the deprecia
tion deduction available to these com
panies for tax purposes, the low-basis
company would generate a greater tax
and therefore less after-tax earnings. As
these earnings are capitalized in order to
arrive at value, the low-basis company,
having a lower after-tax earnings, will
be determined to have a lower value.
Thus, the capitalization-of-earnings ap
proach, which is the principal determi
nant for an operating company, implic
itly discounts for the corporate-tax is

Without question, purchasers will lx
concerned about the tax posture of cor
porations they seek to acquire. In ex
amining the corporation they contem
plate acquiring, purchasers will surely
take into aceount the repeal of Genera
Utilities. And since valuation for estate
tax purposes is a function of the mar
ketplace of hypothetical purchasers ant
sellers, it is appropriate to reflect in thi
tax valuation a discount for the corpo
rate-level tax that purchasers wil
require.
^
FOOTNOTES

1. See Sec. 334(a) of the Code; when the pur
chaser is a corp., an election under § 338 would be
available.
2. See Sec. 336 of the Code and § 337 in the case
of a §338 election, as it existed prior to the Act. But
even under pre-Act law, there were instances in
which a liquidating corporation was required to
recognize gain. For example, a liquidating corpo
ration was required to recognize depreciation re rit
capture income. (Sections 1245 and 1250 of the pre- et:
Act code.) In addition, see Hillsboro National Bank
vs. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), 370 (1983), m
where the court held that the tax-benefit rule re io
quires income recognition when events occur that
til
are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier de
duction. Although the tax-benefit and recapture et
concepts resulted in some liquidations being tax
;ui
able in part under the pre-Act law, no case could be
found discussing the implication in the estate-tax
context.
3. See Sec. 337, as it existed prior to the Act; see,
also note 2.
4. Section 631 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.

c

J.
6. lU.
For a discussion of the income-tax aspects of
the repeal of Genera! Utilities, see Bonovitz, Im
pact of the TRA Repeal of General Utilities, 65
JTAX 388 (Dec. 1986).
p;
7. It may not be necessary to actually liquidate
the acquired corporation. An election under § 338 ^
of the code creates the effect of a liquidation for tax tl
purposes, though the acquired corporation remains j-.
imaci.
8. Of course, no depreciation deduction would be '
available with respect to the land.
f,
9. See Section 336 of the code.
^
10. Fortune, Dec. 8, 1986.
11. See, e.g.. Revs. Rul. 59-60, 59-1 C.B. 237.
1
12. In Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and
Gift Tax (1962), at p. 526, the authors state that
there is “. . .a question as to whether the actual
or fictional costs of liquidation, such as selling costs
and taxes, should be deducted from assets value.
But see Weber vs. Rasquin, 101 F.2d 62 (2d Or.
1939), and Forbes vs. Hassett, 38 F. Supp 62 (D.
Mass. 1941), revd. on other issues 124 F.2d 925 (1st
Cir. 1942). In the former case, the Second Circuit
held that the expenses of liquidation should be
taken into account; but it must be noted that a liq
uidation of the corporation at issue was in fact
contemplated, though the court observed that the
decision to liquidate might be reversed. In the lat
ter case, the court, noting that no liquidation was
anticipated, held that a discount was appropriate
for the expenses associated with a liquidation.
13. See, however, note 12.
14. Certain purchasers Will be unable to take ad
vantage of S treatment. Section 1361 (b)(1) of the
Code provides that in order to elect to be an S cor
poration, a corporation must satisfy each of the
following conditions: 1. It must be a domestic cor
poration that isn’t an ineligible corporation; 2, It
must have more than 35 shareholders: 3. Each
shareholder must be an individual who isn’t a non
resident alien; and 4. It can have only one class of
stock.
15. See Lowndes and Kramer, note 12, at p. 523.
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